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The Promise and Problem of Recognition Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of recognition is becoming an increasingly important component within 
contemporary critical theory. Fuelled by the work of Axel Honneth, recognition theory offers 
a powerful means for diagnosing social problems, understanding and justifying social 
struggles, and identifying the direction of societal change. It also contributes to an important 
rethinking of the self, identity and social relationships by initiating a shift from an atomistic to 
an intersubjective model of the subject. However, despite the evident promise of recognition 
theory, there are important problems to be addressed. In particular, a number of theorists have 
highlighted the ways in which recognition is intertwined with the issues of power and social 
regulation. This can be seen in the struggles for and against recognition experienced by many 
individuals in virtue of their gender identity. In particular, trans politics highlights the complex, 
ambivalent nature of recognition. Contrary to the arguments of some theorists, rather than 
rejecting recognition theory it is necessary to retain the valuable, positive insights it offers 
whilst remaining attentive to the dangers that attach to acts of recognition. This calls for an 
appreciation of the complex nature and ambivalent effects of recognition. It also suggests the 
need to explore ways of reducing the salience of recognition in social life, at least with regard 
to gender identity. 
 
 
(I) The Emergence of Recognition Theory 
 
The roots of modern recognition theory lie in the work of Hegel (1977; 1991), who in turn 
develops aspects of Fichte’s (2000) philosophy of right and freedom. One of Hegel’s key 
insights – outlined in his oft-discussed “master-slave dialectic” (Hegel, 1997: 111ff.) – is that 
the development of self-consciousness requires recognition from other conscious beings 
(Hegel, ibid: 46ff.). In particular, the experience of oneself as a free, self-determining agent 
can occur only if one is recognised as such by other beings whom one in turn recognises as 
free.1 The result is that we must mutually recognise one another as free, thus highlighting the 
importance of equal social relationships (rather than the unequal social relationships 
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constitutive of, say, slavery). The general point to extract from this is that certain key aspects 
of the self can only develop and be sustained if individuals are recognised in appropriate ways 
by other social beings. We are thus dependent upon receiving recognition from others if we are 
to understand and value who we are. This marks an important shift from the atomistic self, in 
which the individual is considered to be a self-contained, independent entity, to an 
intersubjective model of the self, which stresses the deep imbrications and interdependencies 
between the self and others.  
 
Although the idea of recognition and its connection to the self was developed by a number of 
philosophers working in traditions heavily influenced by Hegel, most notably existentialism, 
Marxism and phenomenology, it was not until the work of Charles Taylor that a specifically 
political theory of recognition was developed. Taylor’s classic essay, entitled 
“Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition” (Taylor, 1994), set the tone for debates 
about identity and recognition within normative political theory and it is still taken as a major 
reference point for discussions of recognition politics. According to Taylor the importance of 
recognition lies in its relationship with identity. Specifically, recognition is essential to the 
positive construction of a socio-cultural identity. Consequently, insofar as one’s identity is 
central to who one is and the kind of life that one leads, recognition is rendered a ‘vital human 
need’ (ibid: 26). The value of recognition can be appreciated by considering both its absence 
(non-recognition) and negative / demeaning forms of recognition (misrecognition). To quote 
Taylor (ibid), ‘Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’. Indeed, misrecognition 
‘can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred’ (ibid).  
 
It is precisely our sensitivity to recognition that underpins its importance: we are social 
creatures that are reliant upon the recognition of others for making sense of ourselves.2 
Fundamental aspects of our self are shaped by how we are recognised and thus, the story goes, 
a positive relation-to-self is only possible if we are able to enjoy appropriate relations of 
recognition, especially with those who matter to us (people who Taylor refers to as “significant 
others”). According to Taylor this key insight explains the emergence, particularly during the 
second half of the twentieth century, of “identity politics”, in which central aspects of a 
person’s self – their race, gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, etc. – were rendered the basis 
of, and justification for, social struggles that defined much feminist, racial and cultural politics. 
Having one’s race, gender or sexuality actively demeaned through degrading social practices 
3 
constitutes a specific social injustice, one that can be overlooked within purely distributive 
theories of justice. A good society, for Taylor, is thus one in which its members are able to 
enjoy positive recognition of their shared, cultural identity. 
 
 
(II) Axel Honneth and the Promise of Recognition 
 
Despite the significant influence of Taylor’s essay within political theory, he does not offer a 
comprehensive model of recognition politics. His larger concern was with developing a politics 
of multiculturalism, and the concept of recognition was a useful tool for him in achieving this 
aim. It would seem fair to say that Taylor ignited a general interest in the idea of recognition 
amongst political theorists, without providing a detailed account of the role that recognition 
should play within a theory of justice. It was left to Axel Honneth, one of the leading critical 
theorists of his generation, to develop the idea of recognition into a full-blown critical theory 
of society, which he has done in admirable detail and to great success (e.g. Honneth 1995; 
2003; 2007; 2012). Strongly influenced by both first and second generation critical theorists, 
Honneth has produced a critical social theory that focuses on the phenomenology of social 
suffering in order to explore experiences of disrespect (i.e. misrecognition) as revealing 
occurrences of injustice. Such experiences, grounded in normative expectations for appropriate 
recognition, can function as both the explanation and justification for collective socio-political 
struggles.3 
 
Although his theory diverges from Taylor’s model in important ways, Honneth nevertheless 
agrees that there is a fundamental connection between recognition and our sense of self. 
Following Hegel (1991) and Mead (1934), he delves deeper into the mechanics of recognition 
and selfhood to identify three “spheres” or “patterns” of recognition that relate to three 
dimensions of the self that must all be cultivated if we are to become autonomous, 
individualised moral agents. These three spheres of recognition are love, respect and esteem, 
which collectively constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful self-
realisation: 
 
For it is only due to the cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-
respect, and of self-esteem... that a person can come to see himself or herself, 
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unconditionally, as both an autonomous and an individuated being and to identify 
with his or her goals and desires. (Honneth, 1995: 169) 
 
Honneth’s idea of autonomy is thus tied to a psychological account of personal development 
in which we progress through each stage of recognition, developing sufficient self-confidence, 
self-respect and self-esteem to take ourselves as fully individualised, moral and self-
determining subjects. This allows Honneth to conceive of society as a recognition order 
structured around institutionalising the appropriate relations of recognition conducive to the 
self-realisation of all members of that society. As a result, societal change – indeed, social 
progress – can be assessed as a developmental process driven by the moral claims arising from 
experiences of disrespect, with the normative direction of that change being determined by the 
extent to which it fosters the conditions for successful self-realisation. Challenging the 
tendency to approach questions of justice through a primarily redistributive framework, 
Honneth has suggested that we would do better to conceive of justice in terms of 
institutionalised processes of recognition: ‘The justice or wellbeing of a society is measured 
according to the degree of its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition in which 
personal identity formation, and hence individual self-realization, can proceed sufficiently 
well’ (Honneth, 2004: 354). This means that a more just society is one that has secured more 
opportunities for positive recognition for all of its members. 
 
Underlying Honneth’s theory is the assumption that humans have an inherent need and desire 
for recognition, which he refers to as the ‘quasi-transcendental interests’ of the human race 
(Honneth, 2003: 174). If our need and desire for recognition go unmet, then we often 
experience emotional states such as frustration or anger. According to Honneth, such states can 
disclose to us that we are subject to a social injustice, specifically that we are being denied due 
recognition: ‘subjects perceive institutional procedures as social injustice when they see aspects 
of their personality being disrespected to which they believe they have a right to recognition’ 
(Honneth, 2003: 132). This reveals Honneth’s insistence that critical social theory must address 
the concrete social realities experienced by individuals, rather than purely abstract conceptions 
of justice and morality.4 Of particular importance are subjective experiences of disrespect and 
the accompanying negative emotions such as anger, frustration, shame and resentment 
(Honneth, 2007). Importantly, Honneth is keen to stress that such experiences do not inevitably 
give rise to organised political action; rather, they provide the potential for identifying injustice 
and initiating social struggles. These can evolve into collective, political struggles if we find 
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that our peers share similar experiences and we are able to place such experiences within an 
emancipatory political discourse. Thus, it is important to empower individuals by providing 
them with the means through which to understand and articulate their negative social 
experiences. 
 
In his recent work, Honneth (2014) has shifted somewhat from grounding his model in 
philosophical anthropology and object-relations theory, which focused on the recognition 
needs of individual subjects and their successful self-realisation, to a more socio-historical 
perspective that examines societal development through the concept of freedom. Specifically, 
he argues that we can understand changes within society as oriented toward realising the norms 
of freedom immanent within existing social institutions and practices. These changes are seen 
to be progressive because they represent the move toward a more just society. The reason for 
this is that ‘which is “just” is that which protects, fosters or realizes the autonomy of all 
members of society’ (ibid: 18). What unites this analysis with his earlier works is that Honneth, 
following Hegel, conceptualises freedom and autonomy in terms of mutual recognition: to be 
free is to be autonomous, which in turn is to stand in appropriate social relations of mutual 
recognition. Consistent with his earlier work, Honneth continues to see social change as both 
driven and justified by the expanded opportunities for mutual recognition granted to all 
members of a given society.  
 
The accounts offered by Taylor and Honneth each highlight the valuable contribution that 
recognition theory can make to discussions about identity, freedom, autonomy and justice. Both 
theorists would agree that a just society, at least in part, is one in which individuals are able to 
enjoy due and appropriate recognition (although they disagree over just what “due and 
appropriate” recognition consists in). This derives from the fact that they each see recognition 
as an essential component of the good life (McBride, 2013: 120). Furthermore, they agree that 
the solution for many social ills consists in instantiating better relations of recognition. This 
means that recognition is seen as the solution to such problems. Of course, relations of 
recognition can be problematic, such as when women are recognised as inherently inferior to 
men. However, both Taylor and Honneth suggest that such issues can be ironed out by 
improving the recognition relation in question, such as when women are recognised as the 
political and social equal to men. Consequently, a guiding idea underlying their respective 
positions is that society should focus on resolving political struggles through offering more or 
better forms of recognition to those currently subject to misrecognition or non-recognition, 
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whether this be focused at the level of collective, cultural identity or the recognition relations 
essential to individual self-realisation and autonomous moral agency. 
 
 
(III) The Problem of Recognition: Power, Identity and the Self 
 
Despite the evident promise of recognition theory for understanding justice and social 
struggles, a number of theorists have argued that Honneth and Taylor both offer inadequate 
accounts of power that limits the effectiveness of their respective models (McNay, 2008; 2014; 
McQueen, 2015a; 2015b; Petherbridge, 2013; cf. van den Brink and Owen, 2007). In particular, 
it is claimed that they fail to consider the ways in which subject-formation is shaped by power 
and hence overlook how relations of recognition, which underpin subject-formation, are bound 
up with relations of power. This critique owes much to the work of Michel Foucault, who 
meticulously documented the ways in which modern forms of subjectivity have been shaped 
by practices of power embedded in social discourses, institutions and norms (e.g. Foucault, 
1978; 1980; 1995). Foucault’s analyses of disciplinary power show how discourses and 
institutions intertwine to shape the forms of identity and self-relation available to social 
subjects. Thus, for example, the concepts of reason, normality and health all enforce particular 
patterns of thought and behaviour that reflect socially contingent, rather than objective and 
natural, conceptions of the human. Furthermore, changes in modern society have allowed ever 
more extensive and invasive forms of observation and regulation, with the result that 
individuals are subject to increasingly subtle yet coercive social and institutional pressures. 
 
These pressures often centre upon the individual’s self, so that they become enacted by people 
at the level of identity and, crucially, are often taken to be expressive of – rather than 
constitutive of – their (natural) self. For example, accounts of sexuality and gender, which are 
often underpinned by psychological and biological discourses that are seen to represent 
objective reality, often revolve around notions of “normal” sexual and gendered behaviours 
(such as monogamous, heterosexual sexual activity between a feminine woman and a 
masculine man). These, in turn, are seen to express “healthy” and “natural” forms of human 
activity which, crucially, cast alternative forms of sexual desire or gender identity as 
“unnatural” and hence “unhealthy” (such as forms of sado-masochism or particularly feminine 
men). The result is that society places great pressure on individuals to conform to an acceptable 
range of human behaviours, where deviance from such norms is often punished and corrected. 
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For example, the categories of “mad”, “delinquent” and “pervert” emerged within specific 
scientific discourses that worked to construct the “healthy” and “normal” individual, wherein 
the mad, perverted or delinquent were identified as a threat to society. Such processes represent 
examples of social power insofar as they determine what particular human behaviours, desires 
and beliefs coalesce into established, acceptable identities. To quote Foucault (1980: 98): ‘it is 
already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain 
discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals’. That many 
people take such constellations of identity as natural and expressive of some real self or rational 
social order helps to conceal both the contingent nature of identity and the functioning of social 
power. 
  
Recognition is enmeshed with these workings of power in at least three ways. First, our 
pervasive desire and struggles for recognition can be seen to mirror the techniques of power 
established in the confessional, in which individuals seek legitimation from authority through 
acts of self-disclosure (Foucault, 1978). The strength of our desire for recognition is thus 
indicative of the extent to which we have internalised a set of discourses and practices centred 
on the production of the individualised self as an object of investigation and control. This desire 
for legitimating recognition may make us more pliable to processes of social manipulation.5 
Second, the relentless and inescapable social pressures to be recognisable – that is, to present 
oneself in terms of socially-established and acceptable forms of identity – exert a heavily 
normalising pressure on us. For example, from the moment of one’s birth (indeed, often even 
before then), we are recognised as gendered beings and this act of recognition initiates a hugely 
complex process of identity-formation that shapes our beliefs, desires, behaviour and 
appearance. Thus, to be recognisable is to be imbricated in a matrix of social practices and 
normative expectations that shape the very core of our self. Finally, the set of recognisable 
identities that are socially available are the result of historical power struggles and congealed 
practices and beliefs, which define the kinds of beings that we are able to be. For example, the 
fact that we are recognised as either heterosexual or homosexual is, at least in part, a result of 
particular scientific and psychological discourses, combined with culturally-specific practices, 
values and aesthetic preferences, gaining a hegemonic status within contemporary culture.6 
 
Although Foucault’s work on the links between subjectivity, identity and power remain, I 
would argue, highly relevant and valuable, he does not couch his analyses of power and self-
formation in terms of recognition. One theorist, drawing heavily from Foucault’s work, who 
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does do this is Judith Butler. Butler is arguably the most influential feminist thinker of her 
generation. Certainly her theory of gender performativity has inspired countless theorists, 
especially those working within queer and gender theory. Although it has received significantly 
less attention than that of performativity, the concept of recognition has been a pervasive one 
throughout her entire oeuvre, beginning with her first book Subjects of Desire (1987), which 
explores the influence of Hegel on French philosophy. Butler develops the idea of recognition 
in a notably different way to Taylor and Honneth, and her account thus provides a useful 
critique of their respective models. In order to grasp the significance of Butler’s discussion of 
recognition, it is necessary to review briefly her theory of gender performativity and the 
relationship between power and subject-formation. 
 
Butler (1990) has forcefully argued against the idea that gender represents some “substance” 
or “essence” that acts as the causal origin of masculine or feminine behaviours, beliefs, desires 
and such like. In an early essay she asserts that gender is ‘in no way a stable identity or locus 
of agency from which various acts proceed; rather it is an identity tenuously constituted in time 
– an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts’ (Butler, 1988: 519). That is to say, 
gender should not be taken as some stable “thing” that we “have”, but rather as the result of a 
disparate set of discrete acts that we are compelled to repeat until they become sufficiently 
internalised to be unconsciously reproduced. Over time we come to assume that many of our 
desires, behaviours, etc. are caused by our being gendered, whereas Butler maintains that 
precisely the opposite is the case. Consequently, gender is no more than ‘a constructed identity, 
a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors 
themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief’ (ibid: 520). 
 
The important point for present purposes is that the acts that generate our idea of “having” a 
gender are governed by institutionalised norms, which enforce certain modes of behaviour, 
thought, speech, and even shape our bodies. We are compelled to act in ways that accord with 
the gender that we are assigned (i.e. recognised as) form birth, whether this be in terms of our 
mannerisms, appearance, beliefs or sexual desires. Mundane, but nevertheless instructive, 
examples include the toys we are permitted to play with and the games that we are allowed to 
play. To repeat the point, we do not play with dolls because we are girls; rather, we are girls 
because we play with dolls. As a result, we must stop thinking of gender as something “within” 
us (an essence; an innate property; our inner “womaness”) and instead understand gender as 
the collective norms and values that regulate the type of person that we are able to be. In 
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Butler’s words, ‘gender is not exactly what one “is” nor is it precisely what one “has”. Gender 
is the apparatus by which the production and normalization of masculine and feminine take 
place’ (Butler, 2004: 42). 
 
If, as both Foucault and Butler make clear, our identities are bound up with practices of social 
regulation – that is, we are coerced into particular ways of thinking, acting, feeling, etc. in 
virtue of our perceived identities – then to be both recognisable and recognised as a particular 
identity is to be enmeshed in a matrix of social control that governs the types of people that we 
can be. Recognisable identities are tightly-scripted phenomena that enforce particular patterns 
of thought and behaviour. On this account, power is co-extensive with subject formation and, 
therefore, recognition (for, as Foucault and Butler argue, admittedly controversially, there is 
no becoming a socially recognisable subject outside of relations of power). This means that 
acts of recognition will themselves be part of the mechanisms of power through which the 
subject, as a recognisable entity, is produced and sustained (Butler, 1997). 
 
This, I would like to stress, is not in itself a bad thing, but it does suggest the need to be vigilant 
of the ways in which dimensions of our social identities (race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, etc.) 
can become reified, especially when couched in the language of “authenticity”, “truth” or 
“nature”. Demanding conformity with such identities can undermine individuality and our 
creative capacity as self-shaping beings by insisting that this is the way that one should be 
(recognised as) African American or homosexual. As Appiah (2005: 110) notes, ‘in the realm 
of identity there is no bright line between recognition and imposition’. This is especially the 
case when we think that there are specific, natural and normative ways of being, say, a woman 
or a lesbian. Thus, recognition can become particularly problematic if we assume that what we 
are recognising are “true” or “real” selves and authentic identities (McQueen, 2015a). For all 
the evident importance of recognition, which Honneth and Taylor both highlight successfully, 
it remains a dangerous and complex social phenomenon that must, at the very least, be handled 
with care. 
 
 
(IV) Honneth and Power 
 
If we accept that the above perspective on recognition and power has some merit, then what 
does this mean for Honneth’s theory? To begin, it is instructive to compare Honneth’s recent 
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work on social freedom with Foucault’s analysis of modern subjectivity. As noted, Honneth 
constructs a narrative of societal development based upon the progressive expansion of 
freedom, which is understood primarily as in terms of increased opportunities for mutual 
recognition available to members of that society. From a Foucauldian perspective, the (recent) 
history of society is one of ever more intensive and effective disciplinary practices that 
increasingly shape the subjectivities of social subjects. Where Honnneth offers an optimistic – 
perhaps an overly optimistic – tale of increased freedom, Foucault warns of ever more effective 
forms of social control. If Foucault exaggerates his claims about the reach, strength and 
ubiquity of disciplinary power, then it seems equally likely that Honneth overlooks the ways 
in which power is inescapably tied up with the very institutions – the family, friendship, law, 
the economy – that he sees as securing the increases in personal autonomy and social freedom 
(Connolly, 2010; McNay, 2015; cf. van den Brink and Owen, 2007). 
 
Taking up this line of thought, McNay (2008; 2014) argues that Honneth’s account rests on a 
problematic ontology that treats power as extrinsic to recognition and identity-formation. 
Because Honneth posits our desire for recognition, and certain forms of intersubjective 
engagement with others, as independent of power, he is unable to account for the ways in which 
power functions at the level of identity. Furthermore, it leads him to understand problematic 
forms of recognition as distortions of, and thus deviations from, healthy norms of mutual, 
authentic recognition. In assuming an ontology of mutual recognition that has been cleansed 
of its problematic effects, Honneth is ‘unable to acknowledge sufficiently how recognition can 
itself be distorted and normalizing’ (McNay, 2014: 58). The production of a universalised 
model of authentic recognition relations means that ‘social specificity is undercut by a 
teleology where power is only ever a post-hoc distortion of a primary empathic link. Social 
relations are judged according to how far they stray from this primary empathy: that is, whether 
they are reified or genuine forms of recognition’ (ibid: 56). The result is that ‘the normative 
monism of recognition does not really capture the multidimensional, complex nature of social 
relations of power’ (ibid: 57). Along similar lines Petherbridge (2013: 6) argues that, 
 
The problem with [Honneth’s] theory of intersubjectivity is that forms of sociality 
and subject-formation are conceptualized only within the normative terms of 
recognition, rather than constituted by various modalities of interaction, including 
power and strategic action. Honneth therefore reduces power and domination 
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merely to pathologies of recognition, and by so doing, confines the critique of 
power to the terms of unsuccessful recognition. 
 
In light of the above critique, two options are open to Honneth: either he can incorporate these 
concerns about the dynamics of social power and group identities into his theory, or he can 
show how his tripartite analysis of recognition is able to overcome issues of power, conflict 
and normalisation that appear to be inextricably imbued into acts of recognition. Regarding the 
first option, Petherbridge (2013) has suggested that in his earlier work (e.g. Honneth, 1991) he 
showed the kind of regard for issues of social power and conflict that becomes a noticeable 
absence in his mature theory of recognition. For example, Honneth challenges Habermas’s 
model of communication for relying too heavily on agreement and understanding, arguing 
instead that we must conceives of communicative action as conflictual. This leads to an 
understanding of the social world, including recognition relations, constituted by struggle 
(Petherbridge, 2013: 30). However, in his move to outlining a formal theory of recognition, 
Honneth’s focus on social power and conflict seems to be surpassed by an assumption of 
harmonious relations of mutual recognition untainted by issues of power. For example, contra 
the Foucauldian perspective, Honneth maintains that it is wrong ‘to conceptualise societies as 
relations of domination’ (Honneth, 1991: 303).  
 
The problem, however, is that introducing a more nuanced and complex account of power into 
his theory would seem to require Honneth to revise his account of social development as an 
increase in social freedom grounded in greater opportunities for mutual recognition. At the very 
least, he would have to provide reasons why we should see changes in the family or the market 
as an expansion of freedom and the opportunity for greater self-realisation, rather than the 
intensification of power relations that govern identity formation in more subtle yet effective 
ways. Appealing to the possibility of undistorted recognition relations, grounded in our pre-
cognitive empathic care for others, simply blunts the critical edges of Honneth’s theory and 
leads him to misconstrue the nature and extent of many social struggles (McNay, 2014). It 
treats power as extrinsic to recognition and identity-formation, which forecloses an analysis of 
the normalising, exclusionary dynamics built into collective identities. It is unclear how 
establishing more authentic forms of love or esteem recognition can counteract either the 
tendencies toward intercultural conflict that seem partly constitutive of identity categories or 
the coercive effects of tightly-scripted gender identities. 
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(V) Transsexual Struggles For and Against Recognition 
 
It is important to stress that Honneth is far from blind to issues of social power. Indeed, much 
of his work is directed toward rectifying forms of misrecognition that underpin instances of 
bodily violence, humiliation, disrespect and social exclusion. However, as noted, he seems to 
treat misrecognition as a deviation from healthy forms of interpersonal interaction, thus 
assuming that social problems can be rectified by instantiating better and/or more patterns of 
affirmative recognition. Not only does this seem to assume forms of social interaction (i.e. 
mutual recognition) untainted by power, but it also only addresses recognition as it occurs 
between individuals. This overlooks how recognition functions as a key mechanism by which 
discursive and institutional practices determine what counts as a recognisable identity and thus 
the kinds of people that we can viably become.  
 
To illustrate this claim, it is instructive to consider the struggles with and against recognition 
experienced by transsexual individuals, especially in their relationship to what are recognised 
as ‘normal’, intelligible and coherent gender identities. In particular, the fact that our current 
gender system is structured along a binary logic wherein one is either unambiguously male or 
female (and masculine must supervene onto male / feminine onto female) makes it hard to 
recognise individuals whose identity challenges this basic assumption. Indeed, it may be the 
case that the processes through which dominant gender identities are secured involves certain 
other gender identities being posited within a realm of the sick, deviant, monstrous or 
unintelligible – a realm that functions to strengthen and entrench these dominant gender 
identities (Connolly, 2002). For example, the commitment to a dualistic framework of gender 
not only defines intersex individuals as deviant, but the fact that they are often “corrected” in 
infancy through surgical intervention by doctors (that is, through being recognised as their a 
“true” or “real” sex) reveals that “intersex” is precluded from being a viable subject position 
and this foreclosure serves to reinforce the normative weight of a binary gender system 
(Karkazis, 2008). Thus, medical recognition of what an acceptable gender identity, with regard 
to both transsexual and intersex identity, becomes enmeshed in a wider scheme of recognition 
that determines who and what counts as viable expression of human identity. As Butler (2004: 
2) observes, recognition is ‘bound up with the question of power and with the problem of who 
qualifies as recognizably human and who does not’. 
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The institutional recognition of gender is emblematic of these dynamics of power and 
normalisation, often working to regulate the possible forms that gender identity may take. 
Epstein and Straub (1991: 3) argue that ‘physiology, anatomy, and body codes (clothing, 
cosmetics, behaviours, miens, affective and sexual object choices) are taken over by institutions 
that use bodily difference to define and to coerce gender identity’. Similarly, Cromwell (1999: 
125) notes how gender identities ‘framed within a medicalized border effectively negated 
individual identity and erased those whose histories, identities, and sexualities did not fit within 
the criterial boundaries of a “true transsexual”’. The medical and legal diagnosis and treatment 
of transsexuality is thus an example of the ways that identity is normalised and regulated 
through recognition (Davy, 2011). In having to prove to medical practitioners that they are 
“authentic” transsexuals, individuals can find themselves heavily pressured to conform to 
particular notions of masculinity or femininity. An inability to embody these gender norms 
properly can lead to treatment being withheld, which in turn can make it much harder for such 
individuals to negotiate gendered social spaces and social interactions. The failure to meet the 
demands of a recognisable (i.e. viable, socially acceptable, medically defined) gender identity 
can render transsexual individuals even more vulnerable to verbal abuse, physical violence and 
social ostracism.  
 
These various dynamics of recognition can be identified in debates about the official 
recognition of transsexuality. In the past few years a number of governments have introduced 
recognition acts that provide legal recognition to trans individuals who want to transition from 
female to male or vice-versa.7 Individuals who wish to be recognised as their desired 
sex/gender must meet the following criteria: (i) be diagnosed with “gender dysphoria”; (ii) live 
as their desired sex/gender for at least two years; (iii) intend to live as their desired gender until 
death (UK Gender Recognition Act, 2004). One notable feature of the UK’s Gender 
Recognition Act (GRA) is that it does not require individuals to actually undergo surgery in 
order to be recognised as their desired sex/gender, which represented a significant change from 
a number of pre-existing GRAs. Instead, the key condition is that one is diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria: the distressful experience that one’s emotional and psychological identity is 
incongruent with one’s assigned, biological sex. Its diagnosis is guided by the Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual (DSM), which is produced by the American Psychiatric Association. Thus, 
in order to be receive legal recognition of their desired sex/gender, trans individuals applying 
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to the UK GRA must satisfy health professionals that they represent genuine cases of gender 
dysphoria. 
 
The introduction of the GRA was in large part the result of the efforts of gender activists, 
especially Press for Change. It was seen by many as a positive step forward insofar as it granted 
the opportunity for recognition to individuals who wished to transition. This can have important 
practical implications, particularly with regard to legal issues such as marriage. The absence of 
the requirement that one undergo surgery in order to be recognised as one’s desired sex/gender 
is beneficial to individuals who want to transition but are unable, such as those suffering from 
medical conditions (REF). In addition to practical benefits, the UK’s GRA was heralded for its 
symbolic significance. It can help to validate the legitimacy of trans desires and identities. As 
one participant in Hines’s study (2013: 22-3) observed: 
 
Transsexuals have gone from being socially unacceptable to being sanctioned by 
government. And that makes a big difference for many people. Whereas they 
thought that I was some sort of crazy, now Parliament is saying I’m perfectly all 
right, and there are many other people like me, and that’s a good thing. 
 
Clearly, the UK’s GRA can be read as an important form of political recognition that has 
improved the quality of life for a number of individuals who struggle to identify with the 
sex/gender that they were assigned at birth. To quote Hines (ibid: 66), ‘Research findings 
indicate that the GRA has had positive impacts for many participants in terms of the practical 
benefits it has brought… For some participants, the GRA also brought increased esteem 
through the legitimation of their identity’. Despite this, the GRA has been subject to a good 
deal of debate (e.g. Cowan, 2005; Davy, 2011; Hines, 2013; Sandland, 2005). A variety of 
concerns have been expressed, most notably the fact that the GRA rests upon and reinforces a 
binary notion of sex/gender. In offering individuals the opportunity to change their opportunity 
to change their legal gender to either male or female the GRA works to exclude certain trans 
individuals who do easily and unambiguously identify as either male or female, including 
intersex, bi-gendered, poly-gendered and androgynous trans individuals. Similarly, The 
requirement that one intends to spend the rest of one’s life as their chosen sex/gender works 
against individuals who experience fluidity in their identity over time, so that they alternate 
between more masculine  and more feminine identities.  
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The abiding concern, then, is that the official recognition of gender identity as encapsulated in 
the UK’s GRA functions to enforce a particular set of identities as intelligible by determining 
what counts as a recognisable identity. To quote Davy (2011: 43), ‘Recognition confers a 
notion of authenticity upon certain embodied practices, which then, by default forecloses 
others’. Thus, the UK GRA can be seen as exerting a normalising pressure through reinforcing 
certain assumptions about sex/gender identity, including the belief in a binary gender system 
in which one is / wants to be unambiguously male or female for the duration of one’s life. 
Those individuals who deviate from such norms are thus denied the opportunity for 
recognition. This concern is intensified by the medicalisation of gender identity that underlines 
the GRA. The fact that one must be diagnosed with gender dysphoria is a major issue for critics 
of the GRA. One reason for this is that being diagnosed with gender dysphoria by medical 
professionals can reinforce the idea, which historically was central to the understanding of 
transsexuality (see Meyerowitz, 2002), that trans identities are deviations from healthy norms 
that need to be “corrected”. To quote Butler (2004: 77), this perspective ‘assumes that certain 
gender norms have not been properly embodied, and that an error and a failure have taken 
place… It assumes the language of correction, adaptation, and normalization’. In other words, 
trans individuals have been and continue to be pathologised by the medical community as 
unfortunate abnormalities that can be “fixed” through medical intervention.  
 
These issues have caused a good deal of unease amongst trans individuals considering whether 
or not to apply to the GRA (Davy, 2011; Hines, 2013). Rather than highlighting that recognition 
is a bad thing, or that it would be preferable to eschew recognition altogether, it shows instead 
the care that must be taken in offering recognition to others and a need for vigilance in 
examining the terms on which such recognition is given. This calls for an ambivalent, cautious 
attitude toward recognition, one that acknowledges its value whilst simultaneously attends to 
its problems.  
 
 
(VI) The Future of Recognition Theory 
 
What does or should the future of recognition theory look like, especially if we think that 
Honneth and Butler each offer valuable insights into the mechanics of recognition? One thing 
to note is that we should not, as some theorists have suggested, seek to move “beyond” or to 
“reject” recognition (e.g. Grosz, 2005; Noble, 2006; Oliver, 2001). Such a move is often 
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motivated by an understandable concern about the intertwinement of identity and power: 
because identities are conduits for power, and recognition is typically targeted at socially 
established identities, then both identity and recognition must be challenged in favour of a post-
identity politics that revels in the unrecognisable. Given the dangers that seem to be 
inextricably bound up with both identity and recognition, it is clear why this move would be 
an attractive one for theorists concerned with the effects of social power. However, to reject 
recognition and advocate a post-identity politics would be to throw the baby out with the bath 
water; it would jettison the very important contributions that the concept of recognition can 
make to theories about the self, freedom and justice. 
 
In particular, as Honneth and Taylor aptly demonstrate, the concept of recognition is vital to 
making sense of ourselves as autonomous, self-valuing agents. Without other people 
recognising us as self-determining beings worthy of respect and esteem, it is hard to see how 
we could come to view ourselves in this way. Indeed, given the fact that we are not fully self-
transparent beings – that is, that we cannot understand who we are just be reflecting on the 
contents of our mind – then being recognised by others is an essential component of making 
sense of oneself. It is precisely this insight that allows recognition theory to move away from 
problematic atomistic conceptions of the individual and toward a more properly 
intersubjective, social account of the self. Recognition theory rightly identifies the pivotal 
importance of our social relations in our self-development and places this at the centre of a 
theory of justice.  
 
However, the above discussions of identity and power suggest that being recognised also has 
subjugating dimensions that, it seems, cannot be resolved or eradicated through instantiating 
“proper” or “authentic” forms of interpersonal recognition relations. One implication of 
Butler’s account is that one may well find that one does not want to be recognised, if all 
available forms of recognition work to undo one’s sense of self or force one into an identity 
that one cannot live with. ‘There are advantages to remaining less than intelligible,’ Butler 
(2004: 3) writes, ‘if intelligible is understood as that which is produced as a consequence of 
recognition according to prevailing norms’. Accordingly, it might be necessary to risk 
becoming in some sense unrecognisable – at least for a temporary period – if we ourselves 
unable to identify with any available form of recognition. Furthermore, this desire not to be 
recognised can itself be taken as a political strategy aimed at challenging entrenched norms of 
identity – not just with the aim of producing alternative forms of recognition but, more 
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fundamentally, to call into question the very notion of a recognisable identity and hence to 
highlight and explore the limits and limitations of recognition itself. 
 
Rather than reject recognition, Butler highlights (i) the ways in which recognition is connected 
with regulatory practices and discourses; and (ii) the problems that arise when one finds oneself 
unable to identify and embody gendered norms. As the previous section made clear, individuals 
who deviate from established norms of sex and gender may find no proper patterns and 
practices of recognition available to them through which they can adequately make sense of 
themselves. Furthermore, viewed from the perspective of existing regimes of recognition, it is 
not clear what an appropriate form of recognition might look like. Recognition will then be 
experienced as a coercive imposition that undermines their own attempts at self-understanding. 
In such a situation, Butler (2004a, p. 4) observes, ‘I may feel that without some recognizability 
I cannot live. But I may also feel that the norms by which I am recognized make life unlivable’. 
This is not to deny the importance of recognition, but instead to highlight those occasions when 
we find recognition to be as much part of the problem as part of the solution.  
 
In light of the above, it would be a mistake to assume that all social problems can be solved via 
improving current patterns of misrecognition or non-recognition. It is this belief that marks out 
a potential problem with the theories of recognition offered by Honneth and Taylor. As 
McBride (2013) has suggested, these thinkers offer a “deficit model” of recognition, which 
depicts ‘a relationship between someone who lacks recognition, claiming it from another who 
has the power to remedy this recognition deficit by granting the recognition which is sought’ 
(ibid: 6). A central feature of the deficit model is that it approaches issues of injustice or 
oppression as stemming from a lack, absence or distorted form of recognition. Consequently, 
the solution to such issues lies in either (a) expanding or adjusting current patterns of 
recognition; or (b) instantiating forms of recognition where they were previously withheld. 
Social problems are not seen to stem from the mechanics of recognition itself, but rather consist 
in problematic forms of recognition. As Zurn (2011: 63) notes, the result of this approach is 
that the appropriate response to misrecognition is tacitly assumed to be ‘adequate or appropriate 
affirmative recognition’. 
 
What might an alternative to this deficit model of recognition look like? At a theoretical level, 
it suggests the need for a more complex, ambivalent account of recognition which fully 
acknowledges the ways in which power intertwines with identity and subject-formation. It 
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might also require Honneth to revise some of his claims regarding the possibility of 
intersubjective recognition relations unshaped by power, as well as his suggestion that modern 
society can be understood as a progressive expansion of freedom and mutual recognition. At 
the very least, it requires acknowledging certain negative power dynamics built into those 
institutions, such as the family, that Honneth sees as securing our freedom through providing 
appropriate recognition (McNay, 2015).  
 
At a practical level, it could be expedient to explore ways of reducing the salience of 
recognition in social life. This would push against the deficit model’s tendency to focus 
exclusively on securing more or better forms of recognition. Such a strategy might be not be 
effective for addressing every form of recognition, but it may well be suitable to responding to 
the problems of gender recognition. Given the normalising and exclusionary pressures that 
attach to gender recognition, as outlined above, we might proceed best by making gender 
recognition a less prevalent element of socio-institutional life: that is, we might make gender 
recognition – and, hence, our gender as a feature of our identity – matter a little less. In 
particular, we can focus on analysing and reducing the ways in which gender recognition is 
embedded in institutions and social practices. This can include debates about the gender 
divisions in schools and the workplace, as well as an examination and revision of the ways that 
contemporary family life is shaped by gender recognition.8 Much more needs to be said about 
such a strategy, but the above account of the problems that imbue acts of recognition suggests 
the need to consider it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The rise of recognition theory over the past twenty years or so has been a rapid and influential 
one; the concept of recognition is now central to contemporary discussions about identity, 
freedom and justice. Both Taylor and Honneth reveal the promise of recognition for analysing 
and justifying social struggles, as well as identifying key conditions for the successful 
development of a positive identity and self-relation. They seem right to argue that we require 
appropriate forms of recognition if we are to live autonomous, flourishing lives. However, we 
must also be attendant to the problems that attach to recognition, in particular its relationship 
with power, exclusion and domination. If, as a number of theorists have argued, power is co-
extensive with recognition and identity-formation, then we must tread carefully when offering 
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recognition as a solution to social problems. If nothing else, this reveals the complex, 
multifaceted nature of recognition. Despite its importance, recognition theory is still very much 
in its infancy. There are a number of issues to resolve and questions to be answered concerning 
both the promise and problem of recognition. Much work remains to be done. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that such work will ultimately be worthwhile. Recognition is, and 
no doubt will continue to be, a valuable conceptual resource for critical theorists concerned 
with justice, freedom and the perennial question of how to make society a better place for us 
all.  
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1 This is one particular interpretation of the master-slave dialectic, which draws from the work of Pinkard (1996) 
and Pippin (2008) amongst others. For an historically influential, Marxist reading of the dialectic, see Kojève 
(1980). Williams (1992; 1997) provides a detailed discussion of the concept of recognition in Hegel’s and Fichte’s 
respective philosophies. 
2 One major reason for this is that we are not fully self-transparent entities: we are never fully aware of the contents 
of our minds or the types of people that we are. This is why other people are sometimes better placed to make 
sense of what we are thinking and why we are acting. Our self-awareness must be filtered through the 
interpretations of others, which places us as to some degree dependent upon their recognition of us in order to 
make sense of ourselves. 
3 Honneth’s work is far-ranging and complex. It incorporates a number of different theoretical perspectives from 
an array of academic disciplines. This includes first- and second-wave critical theory, functionalist sociology, 
symbolic interactionism and object-relations theory. It is impossible to cover all aspects of Honneth’s approach 
here and so only key elements relevant to the present discussion are selected. For an excellent introduction to 
Honneth’s work, see Zurn (2015). Petherbridge (2013) provides an insightful critique of how his theory of 
recognition has developed and the various theoretical influences that it incorporates.  
4 An idea that has driven critical theory since its inception, as Honneth (1991) makes clear.  
5 For example, Heyes (2007) has used a Foucauldian framework to document persuasively how social practices 
such as dieting and plastic surgery invoke ideas of true, inner selves to regulate and normalise behaviour.  
6 On the historical construction of heterosexuality, see Katz (2007) 
7 A comprehensive list of countries’ gender recognition systems is provided by the UK justice system: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/gender-recognition-panel/list-of-approved-countries-or-
territories/table-approved-countries.pdf (accessed 31/08/2015). 
8 It is along such lines that Lorber (2005) has called for a feminist degendering movement. 
                                                 
